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JURISDICTIONANNULMNTSINTERESTS OF DOMICILIARY
STATE Do NOT PRECLUDE NON-DOMICILIARY FORUM FROM
ENTERTAINING ANNULMENT ACTION WHEN BOTH PARTIES
ARE PRESENT BEFORE THE COURT. Whealton v. Whealton
(Cal. 1967).
Daniel Whealton, a petty officer in the United States Navy, and
Hazel Whealton were married in Maryland and lived there for six
or seven weeks, until he was assigned to the San Francisco Naval
Shipyard. After arriving in California he filed an action for annul-
ment serving her by publication at her Maryland home.1 Although
she informed the court of her intention to contest the action, a
default judgment was entered against her. Through her newly ap-
pointed attorney, defendant moved to set aside the judgment and
requested permission to file an answer and cross-complaint for
separate maintenance. Following a denial of her motion, she appealed
to the California Supreme Court contending that the default judg-
ment was prematurely entered, and further, that the court lacked the
jurisdiction to enter it. Held, reversed: Not only was the judgment
premature--the period in which defendant was allowed to answer by
law had not expired 3 -but the court was without jurisdiction to enter
the annulment ex parte since plaintiff did not plead or prove his
domicile. As both parties were now voluntarily before it, the court
held, for purposes of retrial, that it had jurisdiction to grant a decree
of annulment. The court reasoned that the interests of the state of
domicile or of celebration do not preclude a non-domiciliary forum
from entertaining the action because the law of the state of celebra-
tion is applied uniformly in determining the validity of a marriage
and consequent grounds for annulment. The court tempered its deci-
sion by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Whealton v. Whealton,
67 Adv. Cal. 667, 432 P.2d 982, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1967).
Exercising the discretionary power of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,4 the Whealton court deemed it appropriate not to dismiss
1 CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE §§ 412, 413 (West 1954).
2 Defendant replied by personal letter.
3 Defendant was not personally served. The thirty day period in which defendant
could appear and answer did not begin until Sept. 25, 1965, the earliest date on which
service by publication could be complete. The default was entered on Oct. 11, 1965,
only sixteen days later.
4 E.g., Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 580, 268 P.2d 457,
458-59 (1954), quoling from Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155
P.2d 42, 44 (1944):
The rule of forum nonconveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretion-
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the action. Plaintiff, because of his military service, was under a
special disability and California was the only forum to which he had
access. Furthermore, defendant made a voluntary appearance and
sought affirmative relief.
It is not unlikely that disabilities, similar to that created by plain-
tiffs military service, will arise for parties seeking divorces.; For these
parties access to their domicilary courts may not only be inconvenient
but, in some cases, practically unavailable. It seems only fair and
reasonable to allow a non-domiciliary forum to entertain divorce, as
well as annulment actions, if both parties are present before the court.
Because situations will arise in divorce litigation similar to Wrhealton,
is it foreseeable that its rule for annulment will be extended to
divorce?
To anticipate extending IYhealton to divorce, the interests of the
domiciliary state must not be greater in divorce than in the annul-
ment situation. If the interests are not similar, the reasoning sup-
porting W/healton will not support its extension. A state has an
interest in preserving the integrity of its citizens' marital status. The
stability of the marital status is important to the stability of the entire
society.6 Thus, the state has a dear concern with actions for divorce
and for annulment.
Divorce involves the dissolution of a validly existing marriage,
while annulment is brought to declare the nonexistence of the
marital status 7 In the annulment situation, certain marriages are not
void initially but only voidable. A voidable marriage creates a status
similar to that of a valid marriage for some legal purposes.8 Even
ary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transi-
tory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more
appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.
See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947) (examples of
criteria to be used).
5 Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 976
(1960).
6 Id. at 969-70.
Upon the integrity of the marriage depend such vital matters as the welfare of
children and other dependents, the allocation and devolution of property, and,
in a more general sense, much of the moral and religious fiber of the com-
munity.
7 Comment, jurisdiction to Annul, 6 STAN. L. REv. 153, 154 (1953).
8 See Buzzi v. Buzzi, 91 Cal. App. 2d 823, 825, 205 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1949).
Section 82 of the Civil Code provides that a marriage may be annulled for
any one of six causes, if existing at the time of the marriage. In four of the
six causes named . . . the right to an annulment is lost by free cohabitation
under designated circumstances. In such a case the very purpose of the action
is to end an existing status which would otherwise continue, rather than to
dedare that no such status ever existed. Despite the legal fiction that a judg-
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with a void marriage, the domiciliary state is concerned with the
status of the parties, if only in a practical sense: the state has an
interest in allowing its domiciliaries to remarry, but freedom to re-
marry may depend upon judicial action declaring the first marriage
invalid.9
The difference between the actions relates merely to the time when
the defect in the marriage occurred. In annulments the defect exists
before or during the ceremony; in divorce it arises after the cere-
mony.' The state has similar interests in the divorce and annulment
actions since both deal with the marital status-in the words of the
California District Court of Appeal in Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung
Gee:"
[A]n annulment action directly affects the status of the parties, and
is a matter of public interest and not one which is purely personal
to the parties. In this respect it would seem that such an action is
precisely similar, in its purpose and effect, to a divorce action.' 2
The Whealton decision to grant jurisdiction was grounded on ap-
plication of the law of the state of celebration. Since the celebrating
state's law is uniformly applied, assumption of jurisdiction by Cali-
fornia was held not to be prejudicial.'8 If the law of the state of
celebration is uniformly applied in determining the validity of mar-
riages, an extension of Whealton to divorce appears foreclosed
because there is no complementary uniform rule in the divorce situa-
tion. As parties change their domicile, the applicable substantive law
changes.' 4 The majority of jurisdictions agree with California on the
following points: (1) a marriage valid in one state is valid in another,
and consequently (2) a marriage cannot be annulled except upon
grounds existing in the state of celebration.'5 There is an exception
to this rule which centers on the local public policy of the forum in
which the validity of the marriage is called into question. Marriages
ment in such a case relates back to the inception of the marriage, for some
purposes, such a judgment involves and vitally affects the status of the parties
from a logical, legal and practical standpoint. Otherwise, the parties would be
free to marry again without taking the trouble to secure such a judgment.
9 Comment, jurisdictlion to Annul, supra note 7, at 155.
10 Id.
21 89 Cal. App. 2d 877, 202 P.2d 360 (1949).
12 Id. at 882, 202 P.2d at 363.
18 Whealton v. Whealton, 67 Adv. Cal. 667, 676, 432 P.2d 979, 984, 63 Cal. Rptr
291, 296 (1967).
14 Id. at 675, 432 P.2d at 984, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
US See generally 35 Am. JUR. Marriage §§ 167-68 (1941); as'rlATEmENT oF CON-
FLcr or LAWS § 121 (1934); Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 849 (1959).
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valid in the celebrating state have been nullified by the domiciliary
forum upon a determination that recognition of the marriage conflicts
with its public policy.-6
Section 63 of the California Civil Code provides that
All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid
by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are
valid in this state.17
The statute seems to impose on California courts a strict choice of
law requirement. It is, however, the common law principles embodied
in section 12118 and not section 13619 of the Restatement of Conflicts,
which are present in section 63. It is arguable that the legislative
intent was to recognize marriages validly formed in another state
although they could not be formed under California law. Protection
of children and property interests, 0 rather than the establishment of
a choice of law rule-the inability of a domiciliary state to annul a
marriage except upon grounds recognized in the celebrating state-
was the primary purpose of the legislation.
In construing section 63 the California case of McDonald v.
McDonald2l held that it would not recognize a marriage of Califor-
nia domiciliaries valid in Nevada and then subject it to the annulment
grounds established in California law. The court felt that this would
result in an indirect repudiation of the choice of law rule concerning
application of the celebrating state's law.22 Section 136 of the Restate-
ment of Conflicts is cited by the court as supporting its interpretation
of the effect of section 63.23 It should be emphasized, however, that
16 E.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 170 A.2d 726 (1961) (valid Italian
marriage of uncle and neice declared invalid on basis of Connecticut's public policy
against incestuous marriages); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 26 N.J. 370, 140 A.2d 65
(1958) (valid Indiana marriage of New Jersey domiciles annulled in New Jersey
because wife was under age of consent at the time of the marriage). See also RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFUICT OF LAws § 132 (1934); UNIFORM MARRIAGE EvAsIoN Acr §§ 1-2
(act withdrawn 1943).
17 CAL. Cv. CODE § 63 (West 1954).
18 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 121 (1934).
[A] marriage is valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of
the state where the contract of marriage takes place are complied with.
19 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 136 (1934).
The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the law which deter-
mined the validity of the marriage with respect to the matter on account of
which the marriage is alleged to be null.
20 E.g., Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal. 2d 276, 169 P.2d 633 (1946) (code section
interpreted to recognize validity of a common law marriage formed in another state).
21 6 Cal. 2d 457, 461-62, 58 P.2d 163, 165 (1936).
22 Id. at 461, 58 P.2d at 165.
23 Id. at 462, 58 P.2d at 165.
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Restatement section 121, rather than section 136, expresses the ideas
enacted in section 63.24 In McDonald California thus refrained from
recognizing that the interests of California in the marital status of its
domiciliaries could serve as a basis upon which to propound an excep-
tion to the uniform rule.
In the dissent to McDonald Chief Justice Waste conceded that the
purpose of section 63 was to recognize the validity of marriages con-
tracted outside of California, but argued that:
This state... has exercised its unquestioned prerogative to legislate
concerning the marital status of its citizens domiciled here by ex-
pressly providing [in section 82 of the California Civil Code] that
such marriages may be annulled when the proper ground is estab-
lished.25
Essentially he reasons that section 8220 complements section 63 and
the validity of foreign marriages is recognized in principle. However,
the foreign marriages of California domiciliaries may be nullified on
grounds established by California law in section 82.
The majority acknowledges the power of the state over its domi-
ciliaries. In the words of the court:
Each state may follow its citizens into another state and regulate the
status of its own citizens, especially such a status as the marriage
relation.27
However, in contrast to the dissent's interpretation of the applicability
of section 82, the majority finds that California has enacted no legisla-
tion regulating marriages of its citizens occurring outside of Califor-
nia. The determination that the law of the state of celebration
governs, 28 however, is not made in derogation of the superior power
of the domiciliary state.
The McDonald decision does not foreclose a flexible approach in
choice of law. The rigid requirement that the law of the state of
celebration must be applied may be avoided in favor of recognizing
a potentially greater interest of the domiciliary state. The result would
24 CAL. CxV. CODE § 63 (Deering 1960); see also 5 CAL F. AnfY GEN. 104-05
(1945).
26 6 Cal. 2d at 463-64, 58 P.2d at 166.
20 CAL. CIV. CODE § 82 (West 1954).
27 6 Cal. 2d at 459, 58 P.2d at 164.
28 Id. at 459-60, 58 P.2d at 164.
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be a realistic, as opposed to mechanistic, evaluation of conflicts
problems. 9
In the Whealton fact situation Maryland was the state having the
greater interest in the parties' marital status. Maryland was the
marriage domicile, the domicile of the defendant, and the particular
state of celebration. If the state of celebration was different from the
parties' domicile a conflict not present in Whealton would exist. Con-
sidering the ability of California's courts to use a flexible approach
in choice of law, it does not seem a foregone conclusion that a Cali-
fornia court would take jurisdiction and automatically apply the law
of the state of celebration. The court could apply the law of another
state if the interests of that state in the marital status of the parties
were greater than the interests of the celebrating state.
The reasoning of Whealton requiring application of the law of the
state of celebration seems to justify the court's conclusion that the
interests of other states would not be prejudiced if California were to
entertain the action. Basically, it is not this rigid requirement which
justifies their conclusion. In this case the rigid requirement expressed
the correct solution to the actual conflict of interests present. It is this
correct solution of actual conflicts which should be taken from the
Whealton decision. If a fact situation were to involve not only the
interests of the celebrating state and the forum but those of another
state, California should seek the correct and enlightened solution
rather than adhere to an inflexible rule.
It should be noted that a technical domicile does not always have
the greatest interest in the marital status of particular parties: parties
may reside in one state for the entirety of their marriage; and their
property and children may be located in that state. Nevertheless,
during the pendency of an action concerning their marital status, the
parties may have established domicile elsewhere. As Justice Rutledge
points out in his dissent to Williams v. North Carolina (Williams
II) :3
"home" in the domiciliary sense can be changed in the twinkling of
an eye, the time it takes a man to make up his mind to remain where
29 See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExas L. Rav. 657, 660
(1959).
Why should they [judges] not be free to consider jurisdiction at the outset
in the complex of the parties' contacts with the forum state, the interests of
the state concerned in in [sic] the outcome, and a prevading [sic] concept
of fair play to all parties?
80 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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he is when he is away from home. He need to no more than
decide, by a flash of thought, to stay "either permanently or for an
indefinite or unlimited length of time." No other connection of
permanence is required.31
'When referring to the greater interests of the state of domicile, a
court is usually acknowledging the greater interests of that state, not
the importance of domicile. The decision as to which state has the
greatest interest should not be based, in all cases, on technical
domicile3 2 A non-domidliary state may have by far the greater in-
terest in the marital status of the particular parties and it is this
state's interest which the forum should recognize.33
The concept of domicile in the area of marital actions was im-
portant as the basis upon which to constitutionally allow annulments
and divorces ex parte.34 The importance to a state of its ability to
protect its domiciliaries was considered sufficient to subdue conten-
tions that an absent defendant was being unduly prejudiced 5 How-
ever, where both parties are voluntarily before the court the importance
of domicile in this context fades. In Williams I16 the Supreme Court
made the statement that "[u]nder our system of law, judicial power
to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on
domidle."' 7 The statement was made in dealing with an ex parte
divorce situation. Should it also be interpreted to require domicile
as a constitutional prerequisite to jurisdiction in divorce actions where
both parties are before the court? The Supreme Court has not an-
swered this question.3
31 Id. at 257.
32 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 683 (3rd Cir. 1953) (J. Hastie dissenting).
Thus, when a court is asked to grant a divorce it very often finds that not one
domicil but at least two-potentially more through refinements of the "marital
domicil" concept-may be interested in the parties and their relationship. In
these all too familiar situations of divided domicil, the jurisdictional require-
ment which the majority regards as so essential to fairness that it can not be
changed is a troublemaker and a potential source of injustice.
33 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel and
Borax, 34 U. C-I. L. REv. 26, 48 (1966).
34 E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942). See also 39
CORNELL L.Q. 293, 299 (1954).
Domicile is essential to due process where the suit is based on constructive
service, because without it the court has no jurisdiction whatever-neither
in personam or in rem.
36 The divorce action has been considered an action in rem, the marital status being
the "res" which was present in the state of domicile. See Comment, jurisdiction to
Annul, supra note 7, at 161.
36 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
37 Id. at 229.
38 39 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 34, at 297. See also Comment, Recognition of
Foreign Country Divorces: Is Domicile Really Necessary?, 40 CALIF. L. RaV. 93, 96
(1952).
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Seemingly the requirements of due process are met if the defendant
is personally served or enters a general appearance.39 Supreme Court
decisions foreclosing attack upon divorce decrees on the basis of
domicile where both parties are voluntarily before the court lend
support to the contention that no denial of due process exists.40
There remains the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in Alton v. Alton4 which held that failure of the Virgin Islands to
require domicile as a basis for divorce jurisdiction was unconstitu-
tional. The court concluded that the statute violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The question of whom is being denied
due process is not directly answered by the court. The parties were
voluntarily present and each had the opportunity to be heard. Cer-
tainly they were not being denied the safeguards inherent in the
concept of due process. The court states:
Nevertheless, if the jurisdiction for divorce continues to be based on
domicile, as we think it does, we believe it to be lack of due process
for one state to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations
between those domiciled elsewhere.42
Is it then the domiciliary state which is being denied due process?
This necessitates construing the state as a "person" under the amend-
ment and its interest in the marital status as "property." Certainly,
this is an unusual construction and one which does not seem con-
stitutionally sound.
The Alton decision has been interpreted as concluding that a
decree is in denial of due process if not entitled to full faith and
credit. However, the Supreme Court has never decided that full faith
and credit and due process are the same.4 Domicile as a prerequisite
to jurisdiction in divorce actions was merely a result of judicial dis-
cretion.44 The vague reasoning of Alton should not continue to create
a constitutional requirement of domicile where both parties are be-
39 39 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 34, at 299.
40 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951);
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
41 207 F.2d 667, 677, (3rd Cir. 1953). Alton v. Alton was granted certiorari, 347
U.S. 911 (1954), but dismissed by the Supreme Court, 347 U.S. 610 (1954), as moot
after the parties procured a divorce in another jurisdiction. The statute in question in
Alton was held invalid in a later opinion, Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S.
1 (1955). In this case the Court did not pass upon the constitutional issue presented
by the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
42 207 F.2d at 677.
43 39 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 34, at 300.
44 Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 968.
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fore the court. A non-domiciliary forum should be able to take juris-
diction, at least in the absence of an expression of policy by the
domiciliary state that jurisdiction should be limited to its courts.4 5
The importance of the domiciliary state's interests recognized by
Alton should not be discounted. In that case, the domiciliary state
was the state with the greater interest in the marital status. The
interests of the state of domicile, however, do not require a fore-
closure of jurisdiction to another state where both parties are present.
The interests of the state with the greater involvement, whether it
be the state of technical domicile or another, can be protected by a
requirement that its law be applied.46 Allowing a non-domiciliary
forum to take jurisdiction of divorce actions, as the Whealton court
has done in annulment actions, would enable parties who have no
convenient access to the domiciliary forum to receive a judicial deter-
mination of their marital statusY
Whealton is a step toward a more enlightened and realistic
approach to the law of conflicts and it need not be limited to annul-
ments. There is great similarity in the annulment and divorce situa-
tions; the flexibility in choice of law required to deal adequately with
divorce is inherently present in the annulment situation; and there
should be no due process barriers prohibiting a non-domiciliary forum
from entertaining divorce actions where both parties are present. An
extension of Whealton to divorce is justifiable as well as foreseeable.
LAUREEN J. GRAy
45 Id. at 975.
46 Id. at 975-76.
47 The discretionary power of the court to dismiss, under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, eliminates the problem of "forum-shopping." Cf., Developments in the
Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 976.
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